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ABSTRACT

Spaces of Statecraft:
How the Bureaucratic State was Built on Manhattan’s Sidewalk
by
Brian Lee
Advisor: Libby Garland
Through an exploration of the rise in regulation of Manhattan’s largest public space, the
sidewalk, Spaces of Statecraft explores the history and socio-spatial implications of the rise of
bureaucratic states at a hyper local level. The thesis investigates a period of more than just an
expansion of rules; it provides insight into an era of rapid change in perceptions and practices of
statecraft in New York City. Uncovering and analyzing how battles over public space unfolded in
Manhattan helps to explain the formation of the local state at the turn of the twentieth century.
The local state gave mobility priority over competing uses of the right-of-way, such as
vending or public speaking. The growing claim to mobility became the means through which the
municipality justified restrictions of other activities. I examine why legal protections and rights for
other activities within the right-of-way struggled to overcome a bureaucratic preference for
unrestricted pedestrian mobility. Further, I examine whether there are alternative conceptions of the
sidewalk, besides those based in rights, that would be helpful in understanding how to overcome
the logic of orderly pedestrian movement. Through this examination, I hope readers will gain a
better understanding of the contemporary sidewalk and question the hegemony of mobility on New
York’s sidewalk.
I ask how New York City’s street came to be a place that prioritizes the orderly flow of
pedestrians and vehicles over alternative uses of the right-of-way. I examine how traffic flow
became the primary purpose of the street through a review of the actions of judges, policymakers,
and the police. I examine the sidewalk through a rationality of pedestrian flow and order, rather
than through rationalities of various rights-based claims that are the focus of much public space
scholarship.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor Libby Garland for her dedicated support. Libby’s
continuous encouragement and enthusiasm for this project sustained me through moments of doubt.
Her wisdom and breadth of knowledge guided me back to coherence when I drifted off course.
Libby pushed me to create something better than I dared to imagine.
I am a believer that writing is best done on foot and with good company. To that end, I
would also like to thank Karissa and Michael. Their frequent and insightful conversations, taking
place on walks in every corner of New York City, have generated many ideas which ended up in
this thesis. To summarize their contributions would take a very long trek. Instead, I will just say
that this thesis would not exist without their friendship and support.

v

CONTENTS

Preface

Structuring the Sidewalk

1

Introduction

Making Public Space Municipal

7

Chapter 1

The Finn Bill

25

Chapter 2

The Police and the Automobile

46

Conclusion

62

Notes

66

Bibliography

73

vi

IMAGES

Image

Description

Page

1

Sidewalks are for Pedestrians (1920)

10

2

Rivington Street Sidewalk Vending (1910)

28

3

Delancey Street Stoop Line Stand (1907)

34

4

New York Times Sidewalk Obstruction 1 (1896)

41

5

New York Times Sidewalk Obstruction 2 (1896)

42

6

NYPD Aunty J. Walker (1923)

57

vii

Preface – Structuring the Sidewalk
The [Essex Street] market stretches for three blocks, from Stanton to Broome Street,
covering to the full a shallow strip of land. The main purpose, from the Mayor’s point of
view, was to rid Orchard Street of the dirty, disorderly, and unhygienic pushcart peddlers’
market, which contributed so much to the life and raw color of the East Side. I understand
the Mayor’s motives and applaud them, but I think the Department of Markets was far too
literal in interpreting his wish. For the markets are not merely off the street; they are
completely insulated from it by solid brick walls, broken by occasional set-in entrances in
plain concrete… I see no reason the municipal market should not have contributed to the
color of Essex Street by opening directly upon it… Instead of scaling the market up, it
might have been a far better notion to turn the street itself into an open-air arcade.1
-

Lewis Mumford, 1940

Mumford, growing up during the years immediately after the consolidation of the five
boroughs, was intimately aware of what the early twentieth century sidewalk was, and what it was
not. It was a place that the City sought to make clean, not a place for disorderly merchants selling
wares or haphazard recreation. The sidewalk was a space to move goods and people, not to pause
for superfluous activities that could take place in markets, playgrounds, or private residences.
Despite influential thinkers like Mumford proposing alternate visions for New York City’s
sidewalks over the last century, most streets haven’t changed their basic function since the 1950s.
In that decade, city officials started allowing drivers to park cars on streets overnight, forever
changing the look and feel of New York City streets from a space for all residents to a space that
accommodate the relatively few that owned private automobiles. New York’s streets have
remained, in function, municipal policy, and popular imagination, the domain of the private
automobile ever since. While the City has transformed a few individual streets on the model of
Mumford’s Essex Street vision, the municipality’s underlying understanding of the street has not
changed. The street is still foremost a space for movement from place to place. City administrators
evaluate and improve streets through a system built over decades, on metrics of movement and
little else. When a bureaucrat evaluates a street, they ask how many cars per hour can pass or what
1

delay the motorist experiences. Rarely does the bureaucrat consider what livelihoods,
neighborhood functions, or recreation opportunities a street sustains.
Bureaucrats have likewise seen sidewalks, that curious liminal space between the private
residence and the public cityscape, through the same conceptual lens. The sidewalk is foremost a
space of mobility for the pedestrian. Of this, municipal authorities are certain. There are breaks,
spaces of respite. Benches, bike racks, all manner of street furniture have their space. There have
been alternative visions of the street and sidewalks, presented by visionaries and critics like
Mumford, Frederick Law Olmsted, Ebenezer Howard, and Jane Jacobs. The message reinforced by
municipal authorities repeatedly, however, is that the sidewalk is a place for movement, a place
primarily to pass and repass.
Municipal authorities frequently cite actions that prohibit movement along the sidewalk, for
any purpose, as a justification to clear unwanted behaviors (such as sleeping, selling, or public
speech). To state this, to take time to demonstrate that sidewalks are primarily regarded as a space
of movement, may seem matter-of-fact, obvious, and thus unworthy of attention. This matter-offactness, however, is part of what I believe makes the sidewalk such an interesting space. This
matter-of-factness led me to question why the City has developed a system that privileges
movement as the preferred use of the sidewalk.
The matter-of-fact vision of the sidewalk obscures what is, behind a well-polished veneer, a
space filled with conflicting ideals and controversy. Planners and engineers develop and adhere to
standards to keep the sidewalk clear of obstructions and traffic flowing, but activists and outcasts
enact a different vision daily. While the City has defined the sidewalk as a space primarily for
movement, sidewalk users have never universally accepted this definition. If there were agreement
on this point, there would be no need for the City to maintain order.
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There are many competing visions of the sidewalk that residents and visitors enact daily.
The hawker selling their wares displayed on a table or blanket. The tired soul looking for a place to
rest. The agitator looking to garner attention through the physical occupation of space. The humble
pedestrian going from place to place, trying to avoid the google mapping tourists, selfie snapping
influencers, and dozen dog herding schleppers. These alternative visionaries practice and reproduce
their own ideal sidewalk constantly but frequently run afoul of legal and extralegal actions that
steer the sidewalk back to a space primarily of movement. The book vendor receives a citation for
a table that juts out several inches too far; the sleeping body is told to move along; the City clears
the sidewalk for movement.
Rarely is it questioned publicly, however, that motion should be the primary manner in
which we evaluate streets’ successfulness. Motion is easy to quantify for administrators of the
right-of-way. Persons or vehicles per minute. Delay. Congestion. Level of service. These metrics of
movement are well enough suited to make an effective space. They are not perfect, but they are
simple and meaningful and taken together they are the tools used to design a system for regulating
the street.
I started writing what would become this thesis in the fall of 2019, wanting to explore the
history of systems of bureaucratic control of sidewalks. I hoped I could share lessons about why
municipal administrators allow certain activities (and thus persons) on the sidewalks of New York
City, but prohibit others. Although there is significant interest in sidewalk regulations subject, as
evidenced by the long list of academic and popular literature, there are few investigations into the
central questions of what exactly constitutes the system of regulation that governs our sidewalks
and how it came to be.
As a practicing transportation planner in New York, the lack of explanation of these origins
bothered me. As a planner, I see the city through a lens of space and movement. Evaluating the
3

congestion of streets and sidewalks is a personal hazard of the profession. I instinctively walk
through the city thinking about clearances and ADA requirements. I challenged some of my
assumptions of what a street should be as 2019 turned to 2020 and the coronavirus shut down New
York City. Out of the many and far-ranging implications of COVID-19 was a rethinking of our
public spaces, especially streets. People are staying closer to home. They are changing their travel
patterns. Community members are demanding space to be outside in a socially distant, safe
manner. Many sidewalks are too narrow to allow pedestrians to maintain 6 feet of distance and
parks and plazas are often already near capacity in many neighborhoods. Schools and business
need outdoor space to replicate normalcy. The City is suddenly reconsidering how to use the street,
specifically the space between the curbs, dedicated to automobiles for the last century.
I don’t think it is a stretch to say that the coronavirus may present the single largest
opportunity to reconsider the system in which we evaluate, assign value to, and build streets. City
agencies and their partners have become more open to alternative uses of the street, but they have
yet to commit to systemic changes. Long-term change requires contemplation on systems of street
evaluation. To overcome a century old system that is so matter of fact is arduous work. To
overcome includes three stages: 1) recognize that there is a system and ask what it is; 2) uncover
the history of that system; and 3) consider alternatives.
It’s time to reimagine the structures we employ over the sidewalk. There are many ends to
which we could structure street administration, and practitioners and advocates alike should
explore them. Instead of a system based on movement, we could dare to imagine what a sidewalk
that prioritizes health, community, or sustenance might look like. Instead of first asking how a
change to the sidewalk will affect traffic flow, we could ask how it would affect community
member’s health or safety. City bureaucrats could evaluate sidewalks not by pedestrian level of
service, but by the number of places neighbors could meet or the number of public forums held. At
4

the very least, we could demand systemic change that requires movement not to be the only pillar
of valuation. These are just a few examples of ends that would require a rethinking of how we
administer streets. That practitioners feel there is only one legitimate way of evaluating streets
(number of people moved in cars, on foot, etc.) speaks to how embedded movement has become as
the primary goal of the street and sidewalk.
Some communities have already reimagined their sidewalks and streets. Barcelona has
developed “superblocks” that create a checkerboard pattern where within the squares automobiles
are deprioritized in favor of space that prioritizes people. On the perimeter of the square the city
maintains vehicle priority. Paris mayor Anne Hidalgo ran for, and won, reelection while touting a
plan for developing “15-minute” neighborhoods, where residents could meet all their essential
needs within short walk or bike.2 Multiple countries have extremely restrictive regulations for
vehicles including high registration costs (e.g., Singapore) and limitations of on-street parking
(e.g., Japan). Two Japanese regulations requiring proof of off-street parking to register vehicles and
not allowing overnight parking on streets, which have been in effect since the 1950s, come close to
the regulations that were in place in New York City streets prior to the 1960s.3
In New York City, the Open Streets program, borne out of COVID-19 pandemic, has given
communities additional space for walking, relaxing, shopping, dining, and building community.
While the City envisioned the program as temporary response to the need for more outdoor
recreation space during the pandemic, many communities have pushed the city to make them
permanent. In December 2020 the City Department of Transportation, for example, held a hearing
to consider making one of the more successful open streets, 34th Avenue in Jackson Heights,
permanent. While this was a hopeful development, the City’s official comments on the proposal
highlight what I think is a central issue to changing streets. At the conclusion of the hearing,
Department of Transportation officials mentioned the agency would have to evaluate how making
5

the open street permanent would impact traffic on adjacent streets. While the City agreed there
were many benefits to making the 34th Avenue open street permanent, the logic of movement still
underlies the City’s decision-making process.4
For those hoping to change how the modern city street functions, it will not be enough to
remove parking or pedestrianize a street here and there. We need to reconsider the current structure
through which city administrators evaluate streets. If communities evaluate the successfulness of a
street purely on how many cars (or people, pedestrians, bikes, etc.) use it, victories such as the
transformation of 34th Avenue will be few. If, instead, communities required administrators to
consider other variables such as access to public space or small business and vendor equity, more
change becomes possible. Making systemic changes will lead to more equitable and livable streets
as the rule, not the exception. I hope that through studying not just the design outcome of streets,
but the underlying bureaucratic systems that structure those designs, I can inspire others to address
these systemic issues.
This project is not small, not something achieved overnight. I hope what follows illustrates
that, likewise, neither was the mobility-first system that now seems so matter of fact. Changing
systemic realities requires rethinking regulations, priorities, and the sidewalks’ relationship to the
rest of the right-of-way. COVID-19 laid bare what many New Yorkers already knew—the current
system of assigning space and legitimacy to actions in the street is not sufficient and is punitive to
many essential functions of city life. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed an opportunity to
rethink how the City evaluates the effectiveness of public space.

6

Introduction – Making Public Space Municipal
In 1897, New York was on the verge of consolidating the five boroughs into one City,
unlike any other in the United States in scale or influence. It was a cultural, economic, and political
powerhouse. The rest of the country viewed it with admiration or scorn, a model to emulate or
avoid. It represented the highest standards of a rapidly urbanizing and modernizing America, an
America attempting to shake its backwater reputation in the rest of the western world. If there was
anything close to Europe’s genteel aristocracy, it was centered squarely in Manhattan.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that in February of that year the Mayor of New York
challenged one of the city’s most prominent merchants to submit legal malpractice charges against
his own Public Works Commissioner. Even more surprising, the Mayor stated that even if the
Commissioner was guilty, he wouldn’t punish him. The merchant responded to this brush off in a
dignified manner by immediately running to the state legislature, who he subsequently and
vociferously claimed were in league with the treacherous local officials. In a plea sure to win over
the other side, the merchant asked whether the legislature would continue to legalize the City’s
extreme flouting of the law, abuse of power, and ignorance. In response to the merchants’ claims of
blatant government fraud, the state assembly member from the merchant’s own Lower Manhattan
district claimed the merchant was an out of touch, soft-handed fellow, who couldn’t be bothered to
rouse himself until half the working day was over. No, the assembly member said, he would not
take notes on how to run the affairs of the city from such a man.
There must have been a high crime to anger these high-powered characters. High crime
indeed: the issue at hand was whether to allow merchants to sell wares in the 3-foot space
immediately outside their shops. This thesis seeks to peel back that matter-of-fact veneer and ask
how the current prevailing vision of the sidewalk came to be and how the City systems reinforce it
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daily. Examining attitudes and legal action about the liminal space that is the urban sidewalk can
reveal a great deal about power structures lying behind the veneer of this matter-of-factness.

Public Space, Pedestrianism and Municipal State-building
At the First Annual Traffic Safety Conference, John Gillespie presented the Traffic
Committee’s report on regulations. The committee hoped to implement the regulations as a
uniform traffic code in cities across the country. In an exchange that reveals the city builders’ scope
of thought, Gillespie read the draft regulations aloud:
Sec. I. DEFINITIONS: The term ‘street’ shall apply to that part of the public highway
intended for vehicles.
In response to the first definition, E.B. Goodrich, an engineer from New York City, responds:
I notice your definition of ‘street’ is only intended for vehicles. Is there any power to
regulate the pedestrian traffic on side walks? I think that should be included and that your
definition should make it possible to include that kind of regulation.5
Goodrich’s assertion that the definition of the street should include the sidewalk is a good example
of why the sidewalk might be better understood as municipal space, not public space. While such
spaces are nominally public in the sense that everyone has access to them, municipalities exert a
level of control over these spaces that limit actions that can occur in them.6 City engineers saw the
sidewalk not as a public space for the public to use as they collectively agreed to. Rather, they saw
it as a space that the municipality ought to shape to meet municipal goals.
Public space is at once something easy to identify but difficult to define. Scholars, urban
commentators, and residents continually debate what it means for a space to be public and what
activities communities should allow in those spaces. On its face, identifying and defining what
public space appears to be a simple task. The volume and breadth of literature on public space,
8

however, suggests that uniform agreement on what makes a space public doesn’t exist. Modern
scholars of public space have argued publicness is not inherent to space, and that it is only through
clashes between competing interests, all expressing their preferred version of the public, that a
space gains its publicness.7 We witness these clashes every day: the street vendor with an expired
permit, the protestor occupying a park or street, the municipal pushing back through police or
design. A park is public, but parks departments prohibit camping. The plaza is public, yet courts
have ruled that acts of free speech can have their time, place and manner restricted. The sidewalk is
public, but police enforce laws against sleeping there.
This thesis examines the history of competing claims to the sidewalk at the turn of the
twentieth century regulation of sidewalk space in New York City. By the late nineteenth century,
Manhattan was bursting with population and activity. As the city grew, it needed a stronger
centralized bureaucracy to build and maintain public space infrastructure. In response to this need,
the municipal government became increasingly professionalized. This local development mirrored
larger national trends that saw increasing government expenditure and professionalization of trades
through associations, journals, and conferences. The professionalization of the municipal
government, however, brought not only new infrastructure but new regulations on public space.
This thesis investigates a period of more than just growing municipal rule making, it
provides insight into an era of rapid change in perceptions and practices of local statecraft in the
United States at the turn of the twentieth century. The City of New York strengthened authority to
clear and maintain order on sidewalks through a bureaucratic regime of reform. Examining how the
City established and changed institutions to shape the sidewalk at the turn of the twentieth century
is central to understanding not only the contemporary street and city but also the levers of power
that structure what activities may take place in municipal space.

9

Image 1 – The movement to clear sidewalks was not limited to New York City. Communities across North America
were attempting to order sidewalks at the turn of the century and often learned from each other through trade
associations, trade journals and conferences. Above: A fellow in Toronto reminds us who sidewalks are for.
Credit: City of Toronto Archives, Fonds 1244, Item 336. 1920.

Even scholars who investigate the history of the sidewalk rarely consider the conditions
they investigate in more than a decade or two timeframe.8 This narrative gives the illusion that no
significant precedents to the way New York’s contemporary sidewalk exists. It also imposes a view
that reducing pedestrian congestion has always been the central goal of municipal sidewalk
regulation. I challenge that narrative in this thesis. The sidewalk (and congestion on it) is neither
historically unique to the modern era, nor is it an ahistorical object, standing outside of the
influence of time, society, and politics. Rather, New York’s contemporary sidewalk has precedent
that results from specific choices of local state-building to categorize public spaces to make them
more governable.9
10

This thesis does not take for granted the current state of the sidewalk as inherent. Instead, I
consider the sidewalk as an ever-evolving space, enacted by the varied visions of those who
produce sidewalk space through their everyday actions. Individuals and organizations that have the
power to influence what is permissible on the sidewalk can make the sidewalk in their preferred
image.10 More often than not, it is the municipally preferred vision of the sidewalk that prevails.
Uncovering and analyzing how battles over public space unfolded in Manhattan help explain the
formation of the local state at the turn of the twentieth century. I believe this inquiry allows us to
better critique and plan alternatives to contemporary power structures of sidewalk space.

Order as an Administrative Strategy
I argue that New York City’s sidewalk results from City administrators’ specific statebuilding choices. I approach this topic using a Lefebvrian framework, which understands space
simultaneously through its physical (materiality, symbolism), practical (use, appropriation), and
ideological (professional practice, administration) components. While a significant literature exists
on the evolution of New York City’s public space, including sidewalks, much of it focuses on the
physical and practical components. Few scholars focus on the ideological component, the history of
public space administration in New York.11
A majority of public space literature focuses on the practical (use) aspects of public space.
Within the practical literature, a significant portion approaches issues of access to public space
from a rights-based frame within a capitalist structure. This structure pits rights arguments against
the capitalist logic of circulation, the notion that capital requires high levels of circulation to
increase potential consumption. An illustrative example might be studies of unhoused individuals
sleeping on the sidewalk (or other public space). These studies frame the rights of individuals
against a municipal (or extra-municipal) authority that may violate those rights. Other frequently
11

studied activities in public space that might have rights protections include actions of free speech or
commerce.
I believe focusing only on the rights-capitalist state structure is problematic for two reasons.
First, it suggests that capital demands mobility and abhors pause or obstruction. While this may be
the case in some situations, obstructing streets and sidewalks is critical in many others. This is true
on the supply and demand side. Exploring the ideological component of space helps to illustrate
this side of capital’s relationship with mobility. Businesses have historically and continue to
obstruct sidewalks for many purposes, and businesses often rely on having spaces in which
pedestrians can be static. The second and more important reason is that to focus on capitalism
(which undoubtedly affects the sidewalk) distracts from focusing on the system of sidewalk
administration. Defining and considering the impacts of administrative systems is a critical
component of understanding the entirety of how sidewalks operate.
Foregrounding capitalism while ignoring the role of administration leaves the impression
that changing sidewalks only requires only a confrontation of capitalism. While challenging
capitalism may have many positive effects for streets and sidewalks, I don’t think it alone suffices
to achieve a better sidewalk. We can change streets by addressing the impacts of capitalism, but it
is also necessary to identify and challenge the systems that cities have developed to administer our
streets.12 In this system, governments often swat away rights-based arguments by claiming their job
is not to protect rights, but to keep streets free of obstruction in administering a clear sidewalk.
Courts have accepted this argument over the last century. I examine the history of New York City
sidewalk space to understand the tension between rights claims and order. I argue that Lefebvre’s
third prong, ideology, is critical to understanding public space and also in constructing alternatives
to rights-based practical arguments.

12

Public space scholars have traced order as a specific municipal strategy in New York City
until at least the early nineteenth century.13 Much of the recent public space analysis, however, has
focused on the neoliberal era and the semi-privatization of public space. Municipal governments
have used instruments of public-private partnership such as business improvements districts (BIDs)
since the 1980s to co-opt and neutralize alternatives to the public’s preferred version of the
sidewalk.14 Since the 1980s municipalities have increasingly used order as a facsimile for safety. 15
In this period one entity (the municipality) and its authorized partners (including but not limited to
BIDs, economic development corporations, and private developers) have been the arbiters of not
only what ‘order’ means but also what meaningful urban form is.
Many researchers agree that municipalities view obstruction of the sidewalk with suspicion,
but present differing explanations for why. While some have argued that city planners have long
viewed public spaces as devoted to commercially necessary movement, others have argued that to
understand the municipal disdain for obstruction, it is necessary to step outside the lens of
capitalism and the human subject.16
Viewing the sidewalk through a human-centered lens, civic humanist conceptions of public
space (including public space theory, urban design, and mobility studies) focus on the social,
ethical, and political effects of the sidewalk. To step outside these frameworks allows for an
evaluation of Lefebvre’s ideological (administrative) component, rather than the human centered
practical (use) component of public space. In contrast to civic humanist rationalities, an ideological
analysis of the sidewalk (I will use Nicholas Blomley’s term “pedestrianism”) seeks to evaluate the
sidewalk through a functional logic rather than a social, ethical, or political one.
Pedestrianism “understands the sidewalk as a finite public resource that is always
threatened by multiple, competing interests and uses.” Authorities maintaining sidewalks aim to
arrange “bodies and objects to ensure that the primary function of the sidewalk is sustained: that
13

being the orderly movement of pedestrians from point a to point b.”17 Bureaucrats who manage
sidewalks can thus sidestep rights-based arguments of civic humanists and present their logic as a
neutral, depoliticized conception of the sidewalk focused on providing a path clear of obstruction.
The administrator might argue they dehumanize (used in the most positive sense) the sidewalk and
see any obstruction (animate or inanimate) as a failure. Pedestrianism takes a complex place (of
political, social, economic activity) that is difficult to manage and abstracts it into quantifiable
categories and spaces (of pedestrian traffic flows). Through these defined categories and spaces,
bureaucrats provide the means to make the municipal logic of the sidewalk legible to the greater
population. It is a “logic of calculation and evaluation,” that has “become so engrained that its
particularity is rarely acknowledged. Insofar as its practitioners are concerned, it is simply the way
the sidewalk exists.”18
The inability or refusal to take pedestrianism seriously, to identify it as something entirely
outside the rights-based world of civic humanism, hinders any scholarly or activist attempt to
challenge the power of sidewalk regulations. Judges have given great deference to municipal
administrators’ legitimacy in regulating public space and deny challenges to regulations that come
from a civic humanist point of view. Administrators argue that sidewalk regulations apply a
calculus of pedestrian traffic flow and maintain actions that civic humanists seek to protect, such as
free speech or sidewalk sleeping, are permissible as long as they don’t impede the primary purpose
of the sidewalk: pedestrian movement.
What we need in order to solve public space issues that vex sidewalk scholars and activists
is, as Blomley proposed, to argue from within pedestrianism. We must propose solutions from
within the ideological lens of the sidewalk.19 To ignore the administration of the sidewalk for larger
economic, social, and political frames is to miss the trees for the forest. It takes for granted the fact
that an administrative state capable of enforcing such regulations exists. I apply an ideological
14

framework that foregrounds New York City’s local administrative state to examine this history of
sidewalk regulation.

The National and the Hyper-Local
New York City’s street and the sidewalk had, by the end of the twentieth century, become
municipal spaces, defined and regulated by municipal state to meet their preferred their vision. This
was not the case at the beginning of the century. In the early decades of the century, municipal
governments implemented policies based on local conditions and events. This local movement,
however, was also part of a larger national trend. To illustrate this point, I return to Mr. Gillespie,
Mr. Goodrich, and their colleagues at the First Annual Traffic Safety Conference which brought
together municipal professionals from across the country. Their conversation over the definition of
the street continues:

Mr. GILLESPIE: The term "curb" shall apply to the boundaries of a street.
A DELEGATE: I would suggest that the word "driveway" be used instead of "street."
CHAIRMAN: The sidewalk is a part of the street according to proper interpretation.
Mr. GILLESPIE: That's why I believe this was put in here.
A DELEGATE: There is a strong effort being made to change that definition
Mr. TALBERT: I think the highway extends from building line to building line. We can
subdivide that space, but the street extends from building to building

Again, we see an effort by these city builders to not only define the parts of the street but to divide,
subdivide, and categorize the parts of the street. Prior to this, there was a single space. While there
were understandings and behaviors evolved for some activities to occur on certain parts of the
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right-of-way, the state had not categorically sliced up the street. Lacking this categorization would
make the problem of clearing and ordering the streets that much harder.

A DELEGATE: Mr. Chairman, why not unite the term street and the term curb, the street
for vehicles and the curb for —
A DELEGATE: Is this supposed to cover pedestrian or vehicle
Mr. GILLESPIE: Vehicles
A DELEGATE: Then it seems to me that street could be applied to vehicular traffic only
CHAIRMAN: The obvious understanding of everybody about the street is from building
line to building line.
Mr. GILLESPIE: This isn’t a legal definition of “street.”
A DELEGATE: Shouldn’t we have our understanding coincide with the legal definition?
Couldn’t that be changed to driveway and later on use driveway instead of street all the way
down? You would then have the part of the street which is set apart for vehicular traffic
designated definitely from the part used for pedestrians.
This interaction between Gillespie and delegate(s) is perhaps most indicative of the common
discourse of the time. The members of this committee are experts in relatively the same field:
traffic engineering, public works, municipal law, public space, etc. However, despite their
expertise, they cannot even agree on a definition of ‘street.’ I point out this (admittedly funny)
peculiarity not to shame the nation’s traffic safety experts, but to emphasize the enormity of their
task. The professionals gathered at the conference were developing not only rules and regulations
but definitions and categories. They were, from that moment forward, changing the fabric of urban
public space in the United States.
[…]
Mr. GILLESPIE: Of course in all ordinances in most of our traffic laws in mentioning this
the Court says the word “street.” It asks, “what is the speed limit on this particular street?”
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CHAIRMAN: You don’t mean Mr. Gillespie by that that the Court is only referring to the
roads. In other words the Court has in mind that the sidewalk is a part of the street.
Mr. GILLESPIE: They say there shall be no skidding in the streets.
A DELEGATE: Mr. Chairman, wouldn’t it simplify the whole matter if you defined the
street as the space between the building lines and the sidewalk between the building line
and the curb line, and the space between the curb lines as roadway and I think that would
also agree with the legal definition.
A DELEGATE: May I suggest that in order not to lose the identity of the word street, to use
both street and highway.20

The committee members’ individual interpretations of the street, far from clarifying, illustrate how
even municipal engineers and administrators had trouble defining this complex space. These
definitions were of utmost importance for, as we shall see, the right-of-way was becoming an
increasingly complex and deadly place. If the Committee hoped to make progress on implementing
new regulations, they would have to agree on the definition of the space they wished to tame. The
interaction points to the complex nature of the right-of-way as a multi-faceted space and an ever
evolving one adapting to meet the needs of contemporary users. It is a rapidly changing space that
often outpaces regulation, presenting challenges to the municipal state to regulate them, as I shall
explore in chapter 2.
A significant outcome of the interaction is that Goodrich saw pedestrian traffic as enough of
an issue to ensure that it was subject to the proposed regulations. More important, he thought the
instrument to address pedestrian behavior on sidewalks was in a traffic regulation. Excluding the
pedestrian would be a problem as the committee acknowledged pedestrians had their part to play in
understanding and implementing the “rules of the road.” The committee’s report on traffic safety
encouraged pedestrians to do their part to make streets safer. They gave particular attention to
Chicago’s attempt at a pedestrian education plan, which included educational demonstrations to
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school children and campaigns to end curb the practice of jaywalking. Nowhere does the
committee make reference of the fact that pedestrians had already ceded significant territory within
the right-of-way. The space between the curbs, once a more flexible shared space, was now framed
by the committee as exclusive vehicle space. If the committee excluded the sidewalk from the
street’s definition, they would lose the ability to regulate not only persons but objects on the
sidewalk. The importance of regulating inanimate objects, not only individual behavior, became
clear in a Goodrich’s own report to the committee.
At the turn of the twentieth century, New York City, like other municipalities, was
establishing government solutions to a variety of social and environmental ills. The City was
forming protocols to solve issues related to sanitation, including refuse collection, street cleaning,
and clearing of obstructions from the street. The City was building a significant number of public
works including baths, enhanced sewer and public water, improved streets, and public parks. This
was a new venture for the municipal government, as before this time private individuals made most
public improvements in the republican (little r) tradition.21 While City departments such as police,
sanitation, and public works departments existed before this time, they had limited influence and
capacity compared to the modern municipal bureaucracy. As the City and its agents constructed
public spaces, they made claims to defining what activities could occur in those public spaces.
Government was not only the means to construct the public, it was also the means to mitigate
competing claims to space.
As the 1800s came to a close, an increasing number of groups were making competing
claims to New York’s public spaces. Local and state legislators lobbied laws that favored or
prohibited particular uses of the sidewalk, depending on their constituencies and political loyalties.
Property owners took many regulations to court, where judges occasionally sided with plaintiffs
but upheld the municipal might to control activities in public spaces. Business owners and residents
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played a large role in the sidewalk’s evolution as they used it daily in ways they deemed proper and
demanded action from the City for actions they thought untoward.
By the turn of the twentieth century, pedestrians, commercial vehicles, vendors, businesses
unloading or storing their goods on the sidewalk, bicyclists and more were competing for street
space. Each group made competing claims, often leading to lawsuits, attempts at legislative
solutions, and enforcement by the Police Department (who often took part in questionable public
space behavior themselves, as explored in the following chapters). To solve the growing number of
issues in city administration, the budding professions of municipal engineering and planning
established a variety of trade groups, professional associations, and publications at the turn of the
century. These associations brought a new level of prestige to the professions through surveys of
American municipal government structure and public works. City administrators used professional
outlets to share best practices of good government and city building during an unapparelled period
of municipal construction. Records from professional organizations are significant to providing not
only the history of city building, but also the history of systems of administration.
As municipal governments provided more public infrastructure in the late nineteenth
century, the early American system of republican (private, piecemeal) improvements gave way.
With this change, cities faced a significant challenge to provide improvements. Professional
associations and publications provided critical shared lessons to municipalities that lacked the
structures to execute large-scale projects. Sharing expertise in building both good government and
good cities was vital to establishing municipal infrastructure.
While city administrators were establishing control over a variety of municipal
improvements, they struggled to define and control the sidewalk. While property was the owner’s
province and the roadway (vehicle space) a municipal responsibility, the sidewalk was somewhere
in between. In most communities, while the municipality built the sidewalk, the owner was often
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responsible for at least part of the installation cost and for maintaining the sidewalk. This
contradiction of municipal ownership and private responsibility provided fruitful space for debate
among city builders. Their discussions, along with associated court cases, and policing policies
illuminate the degree to which defining what the sidewalk is and how to regulate it will provide the
reader with much-needed background before we explore specific instances in New York City.
Goodrich’s own study of traffic conditions in New York found that “In the Borough of
Manhattan, 6 persons per foot of width per minute is considered a condition of congestion and
serves as the basis for starting the removal of encroachments and changes and improvements of
traffic regulation.”22 Cities, Goodrich argued, made congestion worse by allowing business to place
encroachments on the sidewalks in front of their shops. This custom was most prominent, he noted,
in eastern cities and estimated that between 1910 and 1914 the City of New York removed 27 miles
of encroachments from the sidewalk. While Goodrich presented the removal of sidewalk
encroachments as a service to pedestrians, other motives are discernible. Some sidewalks in
Manhattan had over half their width consumed by encroachments and “the removal of
encroachments made it possible to move back the curbs to widen the roadways and thus provide for
an additional line of vehicles…” Practitioners thus saw sidewalk encroachment as tied to
congestion of the entire right-of-way, not just the sidewalk. Goodrich argued that the result is that
congestion is “instantly relieved and, in most instances, the sidewalk was left at wider effective
width than existed before the removal of encroachments.” 23 If engineers expanded pedestrian space
by removing private obstructions, only to once again limit pedestrian space to accommodate
vehicles, it begs the question whether the actual issue being addressed is the experience of the
pedestrian or the facilitation of mobility (both pedestrian and vehicular).
Frank Koester, a German born, New York based engineer and early advocate of city
planning, argued in an essay for The American City that obstruction was an American
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phenomenon. In contrast to the streets of Western Europe he stated that “one of the greatest defects
of American streets consists in their being deface by a multitude of minor obstructions.” The author
suggests that not only are private objects placed on the sidewalk a nuisance, but that municipalities
should prohibit businesses from maintaining window exhibits if they “collect crowds of curiosity
seekers in the street and thus obstruct traffic.” Automobiles (public or private vehicles) don’t
escape Koester’s scorn. He reserves some of his greatest disappointment for vehicles parking on or
unloading over the sidewalk, suggesting owners build recesses into their buildings. Koester
advocated for maintaining the sidewalk as a space of unimpeded movement for pedestrians,
regardless of the obstruction.24
Charles Beard’s 1912 survey of American municipal practices examines how cities
attempted to mitigate congestion in the early twentieth century. In older cities such as New York
and Boston, changing the street layout to a more formal grid was a popular, yet often difficult,
proposal. Given this limitation, city planners sought a variety of remedies, including the proposal
of one-way streets, moving traffic generating destinations, and the increasing the width of the
street. Similar to Goodrich, Beard found that city planners sometimes went to extremes by
proposing “... widening certain streets by shearing off the buildings or cutting down the sidewalks.”
Beard noted that taking these measures makes a significant difference “... in the convenience to
vehicles and pedestrians…”25 Beard does not note whether city planners considered the impact to
the social, political, economic, or health considerations of the street. It was not the concern of city
planners to consider that fruit peddlers or local merchants used the sidewalk to sell or store goods.
Municipal officials saw the street as a mono-dimensional space, which they must rid of traffic,
vehicular or pedestrian. That bureaucrats saw the sidewalk as mono-dimensional, a space of
movement, is not to blame them exclusively. They were often responding to requests (or demands)
from politicians, who were often receiving complaints from constituents. Acknowledging that
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sidewalk space was inherently different from vehicle space, however, may have led to different
discussions and outcomes.
Private obstructions were not the only nuisances which caught city builders’ attention.
Goodrich labeled public infrastructure such as subway ventilation grates as significant pedestrian
obstructions. In his study, he notes that 15% to 35% of pedestrians avoid subway grates in
Manhattan, causing a change in the natural flow of sidewalk traffic and often resulting in points of
congestion. Other public or semi-public objects such as hydrants, street signs, and lampposts were
also a potential cause of pedestrian congestion according to Goodrich. A single obstruction of this
nature, he argued, is benign as pedestrians will “eddy around it just as water moves around a stick
or pile in the middle of a stream.” The municipality must intervene when multiple obstructions
within a block, however, caused significant congestion.26
As municipal officials continued to redefine space legally and physically, they received
pushback from residents and business owners. Courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries played an important role in defining the legal framework of urban space. The courts
found sidewalks to be part of the right-of-way, and therefore subject to the same nuisance
(obstruction) law that vehicle space was. In an illustrative example, the plaintiff in a California case
felt his neighbors inconvenienced him by doing their business on the sidewalk and requested the
city remove objects protruding onto the sidewalk. While the plaintiff won the case, the Court found
objects protruding onto the sidewalk from a property constituted a nuisance to the traveling public
and not neighbors in particular.27
Municipalities placed increasing restrictions on property owners’ (and renters’) ability to
use the adjacent sidewalk to conduct commerce as the 1800s came to a close. Bureaucrats argued
the sidewalk was primarily a place of pass and repass, not for commerce, respite, or gathering. In
the early twentieth century, court decisions solidified the understanding that the sidewalk was
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owned by the municipality but maintained by private individuals. Cases affirmed that despite
private maintenance obligations, municipalities were still liable for any accidents resulting from
poor sidewalks conditions. This compelled cities to maintain sidewalks in good condition, a
significant cost and one that they almost always passed onto adjacent property owners.28 Municipal
liability had a significant impact on the trajectory of public space in the United States. It
emphasized the crucial nature of sidewalk maintenance and the power of litigation to improve
municipal conditions. If cities were going to be liable for conditions of the sidewalk, they were
going to maintain and regulate them to mitigate that liability.
Ehrenfeucht, in a study of Los Angeles’ early sidewalk regulation, notes that the number of
citations for sidewalk obstruction in Los Angeles around the turn of the century was low. Even
though constituents often complained that there was not enough enforcement, Los Angeles City
records show very few court violations for sidewalk obstruction. While interesting, the minimal use
of law is not surprising. Even though cities were establishing sidewalk regulations into their legal
codes and had mechanisms (citations, courts, etc.) to enforce laws for sidewalk violations, law was
not the primary means for controlling the sidewalk. Rather, police power was the mechanism
through which cities controlled the sidewalk.29
Unlike law, which focuses on the liberal individual and punishes after the fact, police power
focuses on the community and attempts to prevent actions. Police power is interested in how a
community looks and feels, it is concerned with preventing the precursors to crime (and therefore
the crime itself). These precursors take many forms but may include disorder (e.g., personal objects
scattered about a front yard or sidewalk), uncleanliness (e.g., excessive trash), or simple disregard
for the law (jaywalking, riding a bicycle on the sidewalk). Proponents of police power believe it is
necessary because allowing a community to show even the slightest level of neglect will signal to
criminals that the neighborhood is not cared for and is a prime target. Police power is also is the
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primary tool through which bureaucracy enforces itself. It is not surprising the City of Los Angeles
issued so few violations, but that frequent popular accounts (such as newspapers or trade journals)
that show such behavior is a frequent occurrence.30 While the City had the means to take violators
to court, this was not how it chose to enforce desired forms of the sidewalk. Rather, authorities
used sidewalk regulations to prevent certain uses of the sidewalk or to issue warnings to change
behavior. For example, in the hypothetical above disorder in the form of personal objects scattered
about a sidewalk, New York City code allowed for citations and fines. What occurred most often,
however, was that police officers would make the regulation known through regular patrols of the
neighborhood, warnings, posted pamphlets, and educational lectures in theatres and classrooms.
Cities favored this kind of preemptive police work precisely because it not only reduced disorder
and improved cleanliness but also because (according to those who promote police power tactics) it
also deterred more serious crime.
I will return to the concept of police power and how it is central to implementing and
maintaining the sidewalk as a place primarily for movement in the coming chapters. In these
chapters I explore how two branches of the New York City government, the public works and
police departments, communicated these expectations to property owners and sidewalk users. In
chapter 1, The Finn Bill, I examine how the Public Works Department used police power to
enforce rules to order sidewalk activities, even in the absence of clarity regarding the letter of the
law. In chapter 2, The Police and the Automobile, I examine how the NYPD’s Public Safety
Bureau used police power in a campaign to mitigate the number of collisions between automobiles
and pedestrians prior to passaging adequate traffic laws.
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Chapter 1 - The Finn Bill
Sidewalk Obstruction and Nuisance in Lower Manhattan, 1895-1897
The imposing clouds, full of stinging rain and howling wind, belied the pomp and
circumstance of December 31, 1897. As midnight drew near the chimes of Trinity Church played a
program of 13 tunes, clashing with a makeshift tin band and improvised percussion. A merry group
of 800 parading singers was no match for the brass band they collided with at City Hall Park. The
joyous cacophony was intermittently subdued by the bursting of fireworks and the reverberation of
cannon fire. The park was awash in a triad red, white, and blue: lamps sported colored coverings,
skyscrapers were flooded with light from floor to roof, flags adorned the portico City Hall.
Bars, restaurants, and cigar lounges, normally shuttered after commercial hours, remained
lively until the early morning, a harbinger of the city that never sleeps. Despite the freezing rain
that would soon turn to snow, revealers continued to throng to Lower Manhattan to celebrate the
new year and a new city. Street cars, carrying a great mass of people from their residences uptown,
ground to a halt as the evening crept on. Police warned onlookers, attempting to steal a better view,
to stay off the Trinity’s fence, but to no avail. For a few hours, it was as if the city had not yet
spread north of Canal Street. A great crowd packed into Lower Manhattan, with nary a square inch
of square or sidewalk in excess.31
In this moment, the last of the mayoralty of William Lafayette Strong, few bureaucrats or
businessmen seemed concerned with the congestion of the sidewalks. As the flag of the City of
New York rose over City Hall for the first time, revelers made their way across sidewalks that had
served as an administrative battlefield in the months prior but for that one evening at least a truce
existed. Instead of representing nuisance, the congestion was a sign of patriotic spirit, a show of
support and hope for the new, consolidated city. Strong, the mayor who ten months earlier had
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feuded with businessman Lawrence Callanan over sidewalk stoop selling was on the way out but
the fight modernize New York’s sidewalks had just begun.

The City Itself Is an Offender
Obstructed sidewalks were hardly a novel concept in Lower Manhattan when The Times
published a page and a half report entitled Sidewalks Obstructed By Merchants: In Defiance of the
Law and the People’s Welfare They Occupy Public Property in June 1896. “Pedestrians have the
choice of climbing over the platforms, jumping skids, or walking out into the street to pass by. The
last method is the easiest.” The article paints a picture of a government in the throes of trying to
establish control over the public realm, but often not able to heed the law itself. The report claimed
that, “the sidewalks are obstructed there as a matter of course...” and because “... the city is itself an
offender, there is no effort by the authorities to make any one obey the law.”32
The matter of obstruction was, from a judicial standpoint, more or less settled by 1896.
Significant precedent existed in English common law and a series of American legal cases (within
and outside New York) bolstered the question of when an obstruction was legal and when it crosses
the line to a nuisance of highway (the legal term for the public right-of-way).33 This legal precedent
understood obstruction of the highway being permissible only when the obstruction was both
necessary to conducting one’s business and when also a reasonable encroachment into the public
convenience. Legal precedent was clear that if it was impossible to conduct business at a location
under these terms, it was the obligation of the business to either enlarge their existing facilities or
to find new ones.34 Despite the relative clarity of these legal precedents, the City of New York
struggled with several challenges to keep sidewalks free of obstruction in the 1890s.
No challenge came close to that posed by the lack of centralized regulation to clear
and order the streets. Despite the legal precedent and an unending stream of complaints from
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citizens, there was little centralized municipal power or will to clear sidewalks of obstruction in the
early 1890s.35 Of particular hindrance to establishing a centralized authority was the fact that a
variety of power centers controlled the sidewalks. The principle power centers governing the
sidewalk included the New York State Legislature, the New York City Board of Aldermen, and
Mayor William Strong with his mayoral agencies, particularly the Department of Public Works, the
Street Cleaning Department, and the Police Department. With these three power centers
establishing and enforcing conflicting standards, the sidewalk was anything but a well-defined
space. In response, the Strong administration attempted to establish and impose a singular vision of
what activities they deemed legitimate uses of the sidewalk. This chapter explores the process by
which the City of New York strengthened its authority to clear and maintain order on sidewalks
through a bureaucratic regime of reform at the turn of the twentieth century. Investigating
Lefebvre’s ideological prong of public space allows for a foregrounding of an under-examined
element of the evolution of the City’s sidewalk: administration.
The City of New York, through municipal agencies, imposed order on sidewalks through
legal and administrative regulation. When established laws were not available to municipal
authorities, they utilized police power tactics such as education, suggestion, and intimidation.
Central to the chapter is the Finn Stoop Line Bill — the events and situations that lead to the bill,
reaction to it, and its effect on the ordering of sidewalks. This chapter will focus primarily on how
four individuals, Mayor William Strong, Commissioner of Public Works Charles Collis,
Superintendent of Incumbrences William Henkel, and grocery businessman Lawrence Callanan,
reacted to, fought against, and implemented the bill. While these individuals make for interesting
characters, the chapter is about their actions and the systems they are a part of, not the men or how
they experienced the sidewalk. The chapter seeks to foreground their roles in and contributions to
the legislation and administration of the sidewalk.
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Image 2 – Merchants sell their wares on and adjacent to the sidewalk on Rivington Street. 1910.
Credit: George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division.
Call Number: LOT 10915

Prompt Measures Should Be Adopted
On Wednesday January 2nd, 1895 outgoing Superintendent of Incumbrances Michael
Cummings transmitted a report on the state of sidewalk encumbrances in New York City to newly
seated Mayor William Strong. The report outlined a significant trend — the rapid proliferation of
sidewalk obstruction including displays of wares from adjacent businesses, pushcarts, and cellar
doors. He implored the new mayor to take action stating that “prompt measures should be adopted
to check the unconditional surrender of our public sidewalks…”36 The tenor of Cummings’ report
to Strong, a plea to clean up the legal mess that governed New York’s sidewalks, is unsurprising. A
wave of progressive (in the early twentieth century, provide critical infrastructure, definition)
voters had elected Strong to clean up the municipal government in a non-partisan manner. The
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Bureau of Incumbrences, charged with ordering the street and removing any obstruction, surely
must fit within the new mayor’s mandate. The administration of the sidewalk was one of many
municipal functions that the Strong administration set out to professionalize.
A coalition of Republicans, anti-Tammany Democrats, and non-partisan reformers elected
Strong the first republication mayor in two decades. He committed to ushering in an era of nonpartisan professional government. His election, and that of Republicans state-wide, had much
thanks to give to the Lexow Committee. The Committee, chaired by Republican State Senator
Clarence Lexow of Nyack, spent the better part of 1894 investigating corruption in the New York
City Police Department. The Committee’s lead counsel, John Goff (who coalition leaders later
convinced to take the #2 position on the Strong ticket, City Recorder) called 790 people to the
witness stand. Through a variety of willing and unwilling witnesses across classes, races, and
professions the testimony elicited by the Committee and sensationalized editorials in New York’s
daily papers, with their national circulation, made NYPD corruption not only a local interest story
but a nationally followed soap opera. The Lexow Committee hearings, which officially ended on
January 18th, 1895, brought to light the full picture that many New Yorkers assumed for years, that
the New York Police Department and in fact a good portion of the municipal government, were
complicit in, if not central to the vice economy. From soliciting bribes to protect brothels to taking
part in extortion schemes, the City was in the business of vice.37 When victims and perpetrators of
this system told their story to packed rooms of interested onlookers, the reaction was swift. The
Strong ticket, with Goff in tow, won easily in November 1894, with a 45,000-vote majority (out of
263,000 votes). It is out of this storm of revelation that William Strong committed to
professionalizing the administration of the city, along non-partisan lines, promising to run the city
like a business rather than as a party-loyal machine.38
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While professionalization of the NYPD was a major focus for the City (a task handed to
Theodore Roosevelt, as president of the police commission), it was far from the only corner of the
municipal apparatus that needed reform. While the Police Department received star treatment in the
Lexow investigations, other departments were ripe for graft and bribery too, including the Public
Works Department. Broken down into seven divisions and in charge of a staggeringly large
portfolio of physical infrastructure, the Department was fertile ground for corruption.39
Complicating matters further for the incoming administration was the overlap between
departments, specifically a lack of clarity on streets responsibilities between Police, Street
Cleaning, and Public Works departments. Encroachments (the act of placing an object within the
highway for personal use40) fell under Public Works purview, through the Bureau of Incumbrances
(contemporary spelling). The Bureau had its own superintendent and inspectors who would
investigate complaints received from community members and would issue warnings or commands
to remove objects from the public right-of-way. NYPD officers, however, would also make use of
their authority to clear sidewalk obstruction as they made their rounds, unless vendors had an
agreement with the officers.41
The mid-1890s was a landmark era for securing indictments and convictions against corrupt
NYPD officers. The first NYPD captain indicted and sent to state prison was John Stephenson,
who allowed a fruit peddler on Duane Street to obstruct part of the sidewalk for a bribe, a basket of
peaches. In an era in which citizens were fed up with police corruption, this relatively benign act of
bribery netted Stephenson a three year and nine-month sentence at Sing Sing. While he eventually
won early release and back pay on a court appeal, but the message from the citizens was clear, they
wouldn’t tolerate corrupt behavior.
Sidewalk encroachment was not just the province of working-class peddlers and cart
vendors, middle- and upper-class retail establishments also took part in obstructing the sidewalk.
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Grocers, dry goods, and produce dealers, particularly in the area around Washington Square
Market, depended on obstruction to do business and would pay off their police wardmen monthly
for the privilege to do so. As one merchant, Thomas J. Roberts, noted he didn’t consider paying off
a wardman a bribe, it was just part of the business. He acknowledged regularly paying between $25
and $50 monthly (about $700-$1400 in 2020 dollars) for the privilege of obstructing the street and
sidewalk.42 Such admissions put into question the conclusions that some research has come to that
characterize this period of sidewalk clearance as primarily an expression of class based economic
preferences.43
Sidewalk encroachment had been a large issue for the incoming administration. According
to departmental memos, Superintendent of Incumbrences Michael Cummings had warned that
while the Bureau mitigated many issues in 1894, including private vaults and construction
abatement, sidewalk obstruction by business stands and display cases on sidewalks had increased
significantly. Cummings noted that “... the greatest number of complaints received at this office are
directed against this class of obstruction. The powers of this Department in dealing with this class
of obstruction,” he lamented “… have never been sufficiently defined to enable us to determine to
what degree our authority extended.”44
Cummings’ appeals are emblematic of an increasingly loud call to implement a clarified
pedestrianist system of sidewalk regulation. He notes his office receives many complaints and
regrets the fact that vendors obstruct the sidewalks. He does not address his recommendations,
however, to the rights of the businessmen or the complaintents or the humanist functions of the
sidewalk. Rather, he focuses on the administrative state. He bemoans the fact that he has no legal
means to deal with the issue within current regulations. Whatever means available to him are
outside the law (i.e., police power) or are unclear in the legal code. The actions of sidewalk
bureaucrats should inform evaluations of those spaces, I believe. If those managing the sidewalk
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act within a structure that does not consider civic humanist values and instead focus on
administration, evaluations of the sidewalk should explore that same administrative prong of public
space. To argue only from within civic humanism against a bureaucratic system concerned largely
with administration is a fruitless endeavor.

The Constitution Gives the Streets to the People
Late January 1897 was full of extreme temperatures and snowfalls that put the city on ice,
leaving some of the busiest streets of Manhattan desolate. Vesey Street, however, was full of
merchants with red hot tempers. The snow slowed down the normal mail, transit, and goods
shipments from the normally bustling Lower Manhattan.45 As soon as building owners had dug out
the snow blocking the sidewalk, hired hands once again worked feverishly to ferry wares from
carriage to warehouse and back again, rendering the sidewalk continuously obstructed, whether by
nature or commerce. Throughout the workday, rarely was more than a few square feet of sidewalk
visible. Vesey Street, home to a plethora of grocers, teemed with hurried excitement during the
workday. Bodies on the sidewalk, two- and four-footed, clashed with vehicles, ware displays,
crates, and loading planks.
The Vesey Street businessmen begged the Mayor to save them. They had carried on
business on the sidewalk for nearly three decades. It worried them that Strong might take an antiobstruction stance in reaction to Assembly Member Finn’s Stoop Line Bill, which would legalize
stoop line vending to both protect some street selling practices but also to order the sidewalk.
While the Mayor noted he was not supportive of the bill, he indicated he didn’t see how he could
let the men continue to obstruct the sidewalk.46
Commissioner of Public Works General Charles Collis, apparently in contrast with the
Mayor, was more accepting of the Vesey men’s argument that they had been obstructing for
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decades. He also agreed to give the men and their allies in Albany more time to pass the Finn Bill.
Incensed by what he perceived as Commissioner Collis’ continued sidestepping of the
encumbrance law Lawrence Callanan, grocery businessman, promised to bring two legal actions,
first, a mandamus application47 to compel the Department of Public Works to remove obstructions
on Vesey Street. Callanan also proposed to bring charges of neglect of duty against Collis, which
he proposed to present to Mayor Strong. When asked how the Finn Bill would affect these fillings
E. M. Wright, Callanan’s attorney, stated that, “The Legislature cannot pass a law that will legalize
sidewalk obstructions… The Constitution gives the streets to the people, and an ordinance taking
them or any part of them away, even with the consent of the Legislature, would not stand.” 48 The
issue was anything but settled, however. Callanan had legal precedent on his side but the Board of
Aldermen continued to approve permits for sidewalk selling activities including stoop-line,
pushcart, and related vending.49
“A certain amount of discretionary authority is given to every holder of an executive
office,” Collis argued when challenged where he derived his authority to choose not to enforce the
incumbrance law. He was not unwilling to enforce the law, rather Collis argued he was “... willing
to act, but in view of the number of years these people have been there I believe they are entitled to
some consideration. I do not believe the public is being inconvenienced.”50 Collis’ argument fell
short on several accounts, first, as evidenced by frequent newspaper accounts and personal appeals
to the municipality the public felt themselves inconvenienced. Second, and more consequential,
Collis’ decision flouted the law. On these issues the courts were clear that past negligence cannot
be a defense for continuing to be negligent. Here exists the hard place that Michael Cummings had
earlier described, legal ambiguity and extralegal police power options combined to create a messy
situation. To overcome this ambiguity, the City would have to move toward (while private interests
prodded) a more centralized, clarified system of pedestrianist regulation.
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Image 3 – A stop line stand built on the sidewalk of Delancey Street. 1907.
Credit: New York City Municipal Archives. Bridges/Plants & Structures Collection, Item 1091.

While the law might have been on his side, it is worthwhile to ask why Lawrence Callanan
felt it necessary to wage this fight against obstruction. Callanan was, in fact, one of the Vesey
Street men. Born 1835 in Clonakilty, Cork County, Ireland and growing up in his father’s grocery
business there, Callanan came to New York in 1853 after a falling out with his father. He worked
his way into the grocery business and joined Peter Lynch’s Peter Lynch, & Co. store on Vesey
Street. In 1868 he became part owner and after Lynch passed Callanan, along with partner and
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mentor James Kemp, renamed the store Callanan & Kemp. Later Callanan’s the store outlived the
man and survived as a purveyor of fine European groceries until 1961. 51
While the reasons for Callanan’s war on his fellow merchants may never be fully certain,
we can account for a fair amount for by his desire for fairness and equal application of the law. As
E. M. Wright explained, “Eight or ten years since, Vesey Street was used for the benefit of private
abutting owners, and the public was allowed but scant privileges…. Callanan came to me, and,
after conference, determined to comply with the law for himself and urged others to do so.”
Complying with the law for many businessmen meant more than removing a few boxes and barrels
from the sidewalk. They had to build new showcases or other means of storage inside their stores,
perhaps lease additional space, or move their entire enterprise. This was the case for Callanan who
“... altered the front of [his] store… work which cost him about $1,500 [the equivalent of $45,000
in 2020]” 52
Mayor Strong, trying to be a non-partisan middleman, stated that while he believed Collis
was wrong and that they had obstructed the public, he was open to the wait-and-see approach with
the Legislature. He agreed that the Vesey men had been obstructing the street for many years and
perhaps formalizing the practice would do some good as it would restrict the practice within the
stoop line and thus provide the Department of Public Works with additional authority to impose
order on the sidewalks. To placate both sides, Strong met with Callanan personally on January 25th
to see if he could ameliorate tensions. The Mayor communicated his concerns over both the
postponement of clearing Vesey Street and the text of the Finn Bill, which proposed legalizing
stoop-line encroachment on streets within two blocks of Washington Market.53 The Mayor stated
that he could not support a narrowly crafted bill, and that if he was to support stoop line
legalization it would have to apply to the entire city.54
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After another face-to-face meeting with Callanan on February 1st, the Mayor made his
support for Collis clear, responding to Callanan’s continued threats to issue charges against the
Commissioner thus:
Go ahead draw up your charges. I shall receive them and investigate them, but even if the
Commissioner is guilty as you say I shall take no action against him. I think he has done
just right.55
After the Mayor’s endorsement of Collis, Callanan announced he would sidestep the Mayor and
appeal directly to the courts and the Legislature.56 In his argument against the obstruction bills (the
Finn Bill and the Leonard Bill, to legalize sidewalk stands to shelter truck drivers, being considered
at the same time) sent to members of both houses of the State Legislature, Callanan argued that:

... to aid in restoring the sidewalks of this city to the uses for which they were laid out, the
free and unobstructed use of pedestrians, and to decide whether the Legislature of this state
can be used to legalize this fraudulent business, I respectfully ask you to vote against the
bills in question.
In response, Assembly Member Finn had this to say:
What does the Board of Trade [Callanan, a member, addressed the Legislature on behalf of
The Board of Trade and Transportation] know about the matter? It is made up of very
genteel old foggies, who come downtown after the great mass of the people have been at
work for two or three hours, and they try to run all the affairs of the business center of
town.57

Callanan represented the cantankerous (see foggie) businessmen who had invested resources into
expanding their stores or thought obstruction had cost them business.58 This coalition also
advanced another, more public-spirited concern about piecemeal expansion of sidewalk obstruction
regulation, whether it be stoop line vending (Finn Bill); truck stands (Leonard Bill); or flower
stands (Murray Bill). Callanan and his fellow members of the Board of Trade and Transportation
expressed concerns that city was haphazardly enacting rules that would lead to further street
disorder.59
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In late February 1897, The Times reported the Mayor had agreed that any workable bill
must meet some of Callanan’s demands for comprehensiveness. The Mayor had called for the bill
to cover streets around all city markets, not just Washington Market, according to a former lawyer
for the mayor’s office. During the rest of the fight over the bill there would be great confusion
whether Strong meant all streets within two blocks of markets or whether he supported, as the
Board of Trade and Transportation did, formalizing the rule for street obstructions for all streets in
Manhattan.60
The anti-obstruction merchants pledged to make obstruction a central issue in the upcoming
mayoral election that fall if they couldn’t get Mayor Strong’s attention about the ills of the Finn
Bill.61 Ceding to increasing calls for citizen input, Strong announced he would hold a hearing on
the two obstruction bills before him (the Finn and Leonard Bills) on March 16th. The hearing was a
full affair at City Hall with a large contingent against the bill, including Callanan’s Board of Trade
and Transportation and the Real Estate Board of New York, both of which had been lobbying the
Mayor and the Legislature against the bill. Swayed by the size and conviction of the crowd, and his
own concerns about the bill’s inadequacies, Strong vetoed the bill.62 Aghast at the Mayor’s
decision, Assembly Member Finn denied that he had the time or interest in rewriting the bill to suit
the Mayor’s concerns, especially since it was late in the legislative session.63
Commissioner Collis stated that in the aftermath of the Finn veto he couldn’t say what he
would do next about the Vesey Street obstruction. E. M. Wright commented Collis had given the
Legislature it’s chance and that if he delayed any longer “... he will only put himself in an attitude
where the public will think that he favors the misuse of the sidewalk if he defers any longer.”64 For
all his coyness Collis allowed his subordinate, Superintendent of Incumbrences William Henkel, to
issue orders to clear the sidewalk to owners stands and showcases on the sidewalk of Ann Street
less than a week later. Henkel claimed that the sidewalks on Ann Street were nearly impassable by
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foot because of the crowd of peddlers and merchants. He estimated that there were approximately
60 push carts and 200 stands or showcases on the Ann Street sidewalk. In response to a question by
a reporter about his Department’s continued struggle to clear the sidewalks, Henkel retorted that
“... we have been badly hampered by the Legislature and the Board of Aldermen in our efforts to
keep the sidewalks clear.”65 Henkel vowed to clear Ann Street and to move on to the rest of Lower
Manhattan’s streets once he dealt with that street’s obstructions. The Superintendent would
discover the next morning the process was not as simple as demanding the obstructions removed,
though. A mob of businessmen greeted him at his office the next morning, requesting additional
time before the Department seized their merchandise. Henkel responded he could grant them a
week. After that he would remove all obstructions and level the stoop-line to the rest of the
sidewalk.66
The wrath of the anti-obstruction faction was not just reserved for the Mayor. Recognizing
the considerable role the Board of Aldermen was playing in obstructing the sidewalk (commonly
estimated as issuing between 50 to 100 permits for stoop line vending per week) a group of citizens
prepared a petition that asked the Board to suspend issuing permits for street obstructions,
especially on narrow streets (less than 60 feet wide). This system of permitting had led to “the
rapid accumulation of peddlers and street merchants in the city,” and resulted in a “flagrant evil
detracting from the comfort of residents and the traveling public.” 67
Despite previously expressing skepticism about not having the time or interest,
Assemblyman Finn and his allies passed a second version of the bill through both houses of the
Legislature and forwarded it to the Mayor on March 29th. Strong seemed to be more certain about
the second version, vetoing it upon receiving it with no opportunity for public input. He reiterated
his desire for a passable bill to be both city wide (again, ambiguous, all streets around public
markets or all streets in the city?) and for it to prohibit the leasing of stoop space. The Legislature
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was much more confident after Strong’s second veto, however, that it could quickly turn around a
third version of the bill the Mayor would approve.68 And so they did, only two days later. Strong,
being in favor of the third version of the bill scheduled another public hearing at City Hall on April
8th and despite a substantial crowd noting many objections the Mayor announced his support for
the bill at the conclusion of the meeting. 69
There were several objections raised at the hearing on the third version of the Finn Bill that
are notable. A.W. Pflueger of the Retail Grocers’ Union argued that passing the Finn Bill would
make the already crowded streets even more impassible to pedestrians. E.M. Hobbs of the Good
Government Club said that the legal definition of the stoop line area was murky and likely to lead
to abuse. Hobbs also noted the law didn’t to apply to the entire city “... as the Mayor had pointed
out that it should, but only embraced two blocks around the public markets.” Once again merchants
called into question the Mayor’s position on what he meant by all city streets. E. M. Wright,
Callanan’s attorney, claimed the bill was an open-ended invitation to use the streets for mercantile
purposes and that it “... injures property in a very large district of the city.” 70
Strong’s approval of the bill made more difficult an already challenging situation for
Superintendent Henkel, who continued his attempt to clear the sidewalks in Lower Manhattan. The
day before Strong approved the bill, Henkel had ordered the removal of a variety of showcases
belonging to merchant David Doyle from the sidewalk in front of the Astor House at Broadway
and Vesey Street.71 Other vendor’s wares continued to obstruct the stretch of Vesey Street around
the corner between Broadway and Church Street. The sidewalk in front of Doyle’s Astor House
shop was unlikely to remain unobstructed, either, as Doyle had his belongings confiscated
frequently.72 In a previous clearing, on March 10th, Henkel had removed obstructions from in front
of Doyle’s store. Henkel claimed that Doyle had chained trunks to the sidewalk to prevent the
Department from removing them. Doyle retorted he was only preventing thieves from taking the
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trunks and complained that Henkel was harassing him. Preferring to take his chances, Doyle
continued to conduct business on the sidewalk and paid any fees to get his goods back if the City
cleared and impounded them.
Doyle’s nonchalant attitude regarding Henkel’s authority was typical of merchants in the
area, especially after Strong signed the Finn Bill. This was particularly the case on Ann Street,
where merchants and vendors had previously complied with departmental orders but ceased after
Strong declined to veto the bill. Many of the merchants had hired lawyers, who advised that if the
merchants had secured permits from the Board of Aldermen, they were legally in the right. Further,
legal counsel advised the merchants to hold their positions and continue to display their wares on
the sidewalk to maintain their status as legal occupants.73 Superintendent Henkel and his staff,
however, continued to use police power to keep the sidewalks free of obstruction through threat of
removal, even in the face of legal protections for vendors.
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Image 4 – Example illustration of an obstructed sidewalk in Lower Manhattan. Images 4 and 5 come from the New
York Times June 1896 exposé about sidewalk conditions in the city.
Credit: The New York Times. Sidewalks Obstructed By Merchants. June 21, 1896.

From the early rumblings of the first version of the stoop line bill to the third version Strong
accepted, only three months had passed. In that time, it became clearer what the City, under a
reform government, could and could not do to clean up the sidewalks. This short time also exposed
several diverging interests among middle to upper class merchants and in the bureaucratic machine.
Alliances didn’t form across class or professional lines, rather merchants staked out positions on
both sides of the debate based on an array of interests. The situation exposes both the degree to
which the Department of Public Works was eager to maintain pedestrian mobility, but also the
precarious legal position they were in. With little clarity as to the extent of the law and the constant
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will he, won’t he of the Finn Bill Henkel and his staff had little choice but to lean on police power
if they wanted to continue to uphold mobility on the sidewalk. Henkel’s police power played out
through officials’ physical presence on the street and through communications through local press.
The resulting streetscape was one where some merchants heeded the message, but others (often just
yards away) took their chances by continuing to conduct their business on the sidewalk. This
situation made clear what Henkel and his predecessors had already espoused, the City needed to
develop a clarified, centralized system of rules and regulations governing the use and maintenance
of the sidewalk.

Image 5 – Example of typical 1890s stoop line vending in Lower Manhattan. The Metropolitan Hardware Company
was located a block from David Doyle’s trunk shop (Vesey and Broadway).
Credit: The New York Times. Sidewalks Obstructed By Merchants. June 21, 1896.
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Conclusion
The Finn Bill was far from the end of the argument surrounding what constitutes the
legitimate use of the sidewalk. That debate would continue on into the next century as reform
politics continued to change the social and economic lives of New Yorkers. By 1897, the debate
over the sidewalk in New York had reached a tipping point. The sidewalk of previous centuries
would not work anymore. Streets had gone from being the place for conducting social and
economic functions to a space to move between places of social and economic functions. The
sidewalk demanded a new logic, one that valued the unobstructed movement of pedestrians as the
primary purpose and viewed any encroachment into this primacy with suspicion.
For the Strong administration, the Finn Bill was a partial victory. The bill legalized
sidewalk selling that the courts previously held to be illegal, but it also provided a framework for
holistic sidewalk governance. The Finn Bill, and the general discussion of obstruction, provided the
basis for a meaningful (if perhaps uncivil) discussion about what New York’s sidewalks were and
should be. As the era of early New York ended and consolidation of the five boroughs on January
1st, 1898 loomed large, the Finn debate provided a civic starting point from which the new city
could decide how to use its sidewalks.
The Department of Public Works is an anomaly in the Strong administration’s reform
legacy. Other departments routinely received praise for their improvements of city conditions. This
was especially the case for Theodore Roosevelt’s work as President of the Board of Police
Commissioners. Critics also regularly lauded the Street Cleaning Department’s efforts, especially
in improving conditions in the same Lower Manhattan neighborhoods that plagued the Department
of Public Works. Many popular accounts laid much of the blame for the Departments’ failures at
the feet of Collis, who’s resignation or removal from office they were calling for by September
1897. 74
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Regardless of the efficiency of Strong, or his subordinates, the events surrounding the Finn
Bill raise questions about how bureaucrats determine which social and economic activities on the
sidewalk are legitimate. The actions surrounding the bill prompt a reconsideration of the sidewalk,
not as an ahistorical space taken for granted, but an evolving place of social and economic
functions melded to the desires of factions with particular interests that may be counter to large
swaths of the population. Bureaucratic regimes impose regulations to facilitate what they deem
legitimate use of the sidewalk and to restrict what they deem illegitimate through legal and extralegal means. There were many points at which the law favored sidewalk obstruction, yet the City
exercised their police powers of suggestion and intimidation to help keep the sidewalks clear. In
1897, the City called the legitimate use of the sidewalk into question and began transforming the
sidewalk from a place of diverse social and economic functions to a space of singular purpose,
unobstructed pedestrian movement.
The transition from the obstructed mono-space right-of-way of early New York to the
ordered multi-spaces (street, curb, sidewalk, etc.) can only be understood through applying a
variety of theoretical frameworks. Lefebvre’s practical (use) aspect of public space approaches
issues of public space from a rights-based frame within a capitalist structure. This structure paints a
picture of the struggles of maligned groups such as the unhoused, street merchants, and protestors.
Practical evaluations have led scholars to develop significant theories such as the right to the city.
Focusing on this structure and pitting rights against capitalist need for circulation, however, often
leads to ignoring Lefebvre’s other prongs of public space. I believe there is significant value in
putting aside, for a moment, the question of rights (even if I am disturbed by many actions of the
city violating rights of people in public space). Evaluating the ideological (administrative) prong of
New York City’s sidewalks at the turn of the twentieth century exposes an important element of
how sidewalks work. Outside the world of rights-capitalist structure, there is a system of police
44

power that governs how residents can and can’t use their own sidewalks. A critical first step to
reduce inequity in how sidewalks are policed is to examine the system that is outside but closely
related to the legal system, the administration of sidewalk space.
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Chapter 2 - The Police and the Automobile
How the Automobile Hardened Boundaries and Reinforced Systemic Pedestrianism

The system that administrators invented at the turn of the twentieth century for evaluating
street space is now so entrenched that it has come to seem utterly natural. This makes proposing
alternative frameworks for understanding and administering street space nearly unthinkable. The
decision administrators made a century ago to prioritize movement over all other uses of the
sidewalk and the vehicle over all other users of the right-of-way has become an article of faith. The
system built around that notion gained momentum and institutional tools (such as level of service
calculations) throughout the twentieth century. Movement as the primary purpose of the right-ofway, however, is not natural. Making the right-of-way primarily a space for movement was a large,
long, and value laden project. Once we understand that, we can begin the process of rethinking how
we can utilize street space for a myriad of other public purposes.
There is perhaps no object that played a larger role in making movement as the primary
purpose of the right-of-way as the automobile. For the last century, city administrators have
implemented and followed systems of regulation that have allowed the automobile to shape and
reshape New York City’s urban landscape. As we saw in the last chapter, city departments and
legal precedents established movement as the primary purpose of the right-of-way well before the
automobile. City planners and engineers, however, hardened and documented this system of
movement around the vehicle, and then later transferred this logic of movement to planning for
pedestrian space. Blomley notes that the notion of the right-of-way as a space primarily for
movement appears so natural that we rarely question it. This system, used by administrators tasked
with making the city more habitable, resulted in urban spaces increasingly degraded for the
pedestrian throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries. As Lefebvre puts it, the omnipresent
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automobile contributes to the city being “sliced up, degraded, and eventually destroyed” because of
planning for “fast roads and of places to park.”75
By the 1910s, no public issue caused as much consternation in New York City as ‘traffic.’
In particular, the introduction of the automobile to Manhattan’s streets produced a flurry of debates
over how to reallocate limited space within the right-of-way. Besides the reallocation of space,
handled by municipal planners and engineers, the City charged the police with the equally
important task of enforcing the regulations that developed these newly defined spaces. The
automobile was a catalyst for massive urban change, but it was not the only object that caught the
ire of the police. The automobile interacted with many objects, including other vehicles (such as
carriages and omnibuses), pedestrians, and bicyclists. While interactions between modes was not a
new phenomenon, introducing mass quantities of motorized vehicles increased injuries and
fatalities on New York City’s streets and made the police, rooted in their mandate of public safety,
a central player in how the city’s streets were maintained. To understand the origins of
pedestrianism in New York City, it is imperative to not only look at typical power brokers of road
design such as engineers and administrators. Examining early twentieth century police attitudes and
recommendations for automobiles can offer clarity about what pedestrianism is and how it came to
be in New York City.
While the unimpeded pedestrian reigned supreme for mobility decision makers in the city in
1897, that changed a few years later. The supremacy of the pedestrian on the sidewalk remained,
but introducing the automobile to Manhattan’s streets changed Gotham in a way hard to overstate.
The City’s reaction to the introduction of the automobile shaped many facets of modern life in New
York. Some consequences have been positive, such as one-day shipping and personal mobility.
Others are negative, including increased emissions, congestion, and noise pollution. Yet more are
horrific, including the continuing death and injury of community members. Chief among the lasting
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implications is, in Lefebvrian and Blomleyian sense, how the automobile led to a city sliced up,
degraded, and destroyed. City administrators implemented a system of regulation premised on
traffic flow supremacy that sliced the right-of-way up into discrete, quantifiable, manageable
spaces. To argue against this tyranny of movement from without pedestrianism is to overlook the
slicing up of the right-of-way for the slicing up of the city. To argue against the former without
challenging the latter is to challenge the effect without addressing the cause. We cannot address the
macro scale ills of the auto-dominated city, cannot without adjusting the micro scale issues of how
cities dedicate and enforce space within the right-of-way.
By the early 1900s, the New York City government had long scrutinized movement (or
non-movement) along the right-of-way through NYPD enforcement and state legislation. Police
managed pedestrians, bicycles, vendors, shopkeepers, stoop sitters, and others. Local and state
legislatures continued to pass laws throughout the 1800s to define the line between public and
private uses. The growing population and introducing the automobile meant more users competing
for the same space. This was not unique to Manhattan, but the constraint of island geography led to
different outcomes than other large cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles, which could jump the
outer boundaries of those cities. With more users came traffic and traditional republication methods
of improving existing, or constructing new, streets was no longer workable. It had led to a jumble
of materials and quality of streets and crowded streets.
The early handling of the introduction of the automobile to New York’s public space
solidified professional, administrative, and bureaucratic attitudes and standards. While the local
state was still interested in maintaining traffic flow supremacy, this now applied to pedestrians on
the sidewalk and automobiles in the street. These standards have had far-reaching and lasting
effects that few could have imagined in the early twentieth century. Twenty first century city
officials, even in New York City, have become dedicated to moving, maintaining, and storing the
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automobile. Estimates for the space dedicated to automobiles range from 25 to 50% in most
American cities.76 When considering only public space, the percentages are significantly higher. To
understand New York City’s pedestrianist reform and how it affects people’s experience in public
space, the realm of the automobile is a critical place to start.
What follows examines how the municipal government managed the introduction of
motorized vehicles to the streets of New York City, and how its managerial logic ordered sidewalk
space through law and police power. The chapter highlights how the Police Department, rooted in
its directive to ensure safety, contributed to developing a pedestrianist system to manage the rightof-way through police power tactics. Police power, not law, was critical to developing this
institutional system because, as the Department itself acknowledged, many of the laws regulating
interaction between automobiles and pedestrians had not yet established by legislative bodies. This
left the NYPD with the tools of education, intimidation, and extortion. Through the Department’s
monopoly on street safety education and messaging, the NYPD consolidated an immense level of
control over New York’s largest public space, the right-of-way. Archival sources, including NYPD
reports and documents from groups associated with the growing traffic safety movement, show that
the NYPD did not operate out of a preference for the automobile or a disdain for pedestrians. Their
actions, however, assisted in a bureaucracy-wide spate of policy and policing decisions that
established a means for the automobile to become the single most influential factor in New York’s
right-of-way design. The Departments’ actions established enormous inertia for car-centric rightof-way space allocation that would continue to build over the rest of the twentieth century.

The Weak Administration of the Street
As laid out in chapter 1, the City had a weak administrative structure to deal with the effects
that automobiles placed on the city. The introduction of the automobile to the multiple levels of
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existing transportation (elevated rail, trolley line, street bed for horses/carriages, sidewalk for
pedestrians, subway, train) made an already hectic environment even more so.
Complicating the matter, the administrative jurisdiction for dealing with the new
automobile related issues was not clear. The NYPD had some jurisdiction over crashes, especially
considering the great number of injuries and fatalities automobiles produced. The Public Works
Department had some jurisdiction as the primary designer of the right-of-way. There was, however,
no one agency that looked at the issues, studied them, and recommended changing street design.
This would be the jurisdiction of the Department of Traffic, a precursor to the modern Department
of Transportation, though the City did not establish that department until 1950. There were even
fewer individuals or groups questioning and proposing alterative systems of regulations to
movement as the primary purpose of the right-of-way. It is also worth noting the City prohibited
long-term street parking in the early century. Parking longer than a few hours would not become
common until the 1940s and 1950s. Until that time, vehicles could typically only park for an hour
during the daytime and up to three hours overnight. The Board of Aldermen, in agreement with the
Police Department, passed legislation that required long-term parking take place in garages, not on
the street. The reasoning for this ban included concerns over thievery, access to fire hydrants, and
the ability to clean streets.77
This weak administrative structure led to a Police Department that involved itself heavily in
street regulation and design recommendations at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Police
Department dedicated a significant amount of its time to the automobile issue. The Departments’
1914-17 Annual Report states that to mitigate traffic and to keep streets safe from crashes had
become one of the most important tasks of the Department.78 The Department’s reports made many
recommendations for right-of-way design and policy changes which were presented to the Board of
Aldermen and other legislators. For half a century, the New York City Police Department was the
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arbiter of street safety. Their recommendations held sway with mayors and aldermen and often
factored into changes in street design and legislation.
Most observations in the police reports focus on potential improvements to driver behavior
legislation (e.g., keep to the right) and capital improvements (e.g., installing more traffic signals),
but the NYPD also made recommendations that fit within a pedestrianist logic. These
recommendations fit into two categories: the regulation of design (including the right-of-way and
objects placed upon it) and regulation of behavior. As described by Commissioner Richard Enright
in 1921, the Department set three areas of improvement: 1) self education; 2) public education; and
3) “Safety-Measures.”79 The first two recommendations represent regulation of behavior, and the
third represents regulation of design. I explore the Department’s strategies of self and public
education, areas where the NYPD had near complete control of their actions and influenced
legislation. In contrast, their attempts to implement safety measures (this term referred to either
street design changes or the removal of obstructions from the street/sidewalk) were tempered by
other City departments and private enterprise (such as railroad companies).

Regulation of Pedestrian and Driver Behavior
The early decades of the twentieth century were contentious ones in the relationships
among public safety officials, street safety activists, pedestrians, and automobile advocates.
Pedestrians, who only a generation before traversed streets with limited separation of transportation
modes, were now pressured and expected to use dedicated (yet shrinking) spaces and yield to
automobiles. These expectations fell short, however, as death and injury due to vehicle-pedestrian
crashes were significant in the early decades of the twentieth century. While there were debates on
how to make streets safer, all participants in the civic conversation agreed on one thing: there were
far too many crashes between pedestrians and automobiles. By the 1920s there were over 25,000
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fatalities nationally resulting from vehicle-pedestrian crashes.80 This astounding number of deaths
is even more shocking when considering that approximately 6,0000 of those deaths were children.
For comparison, recent national statistics for fatalities resulting from vehicle-pedestrian crashes
totaled 5,977 in the year 2017. The national population in 1925 was 115,829,000, for a vehiclepedestrian crash death rate of 21.6 per 100,000. In 2017 the national population was 321,000,000,
for a vehicle-pedestrian crash death rate of 1.86 per 100,000.
This crisis provided yet another opportunity for city builders to decide what they wanted the
twentieth century city to be. Did they want to prioritize private automobiles and trucks to promote
wealth and commerce? Or would the pedestrian continue to hold sway over the streets? Whatever
they chose, the behavior of both drivers and pedestrians was going to be a central focus of safety
campaigns. Newspapers published opinion pieces accusing pedestrians of being careless or drivers
being reckless.81 Concerned residents formed safety associations and working professionals
established professional trade conferences aimed at stemming the flow of traffic violence.
In 1922, Police Commissioner Richard Enright created the Bureau of Public Safety and
tasked it with studying traffic crashes, educating the public, and making recommendations to
improve traffic safety.82 As stated in the 1924 Annual Report, the new Bureau faced an
unprecedented mandate to study and remedy traffic violence in an era when few municipalities had
established similar offices:
This Bureau was established by the present Police Administration to identify the cause of
street casualties and, as far as humanly possible, to provide a remedy. The research done by
the Bureau has developed many interesting and important facts, besides making possible
measures that have materially reduced loss of life and general casualties, due to street
traffic.
The Bureau began its operations, handicapped by the fact that there existed no precedents to
guide its course — there had never been anything like it before in the police history of this
country and, perhaps, in none other. It was compelled, in other words, to function on its
own momentum and to establish a place for itself in the field of Police Department
52

activities. It has acquitted itself in a particularly brilliant fashion, and it is doing a class of
preventative work that has a decided civic and economic value.83

As the report makes clear, the Bureau faced a significant challenge in establishing rules, protocols,
and even basic information about fatalities and injuries resulting from traffic crashes. One of the
first things the bureau set out to do was to define the narrative through the collection of data and
public messaging. Collecting data on crashes was critical to gain an understanding of how people
were injured, but it also reveals a great deal about prevailing attitudes regarding the legitimacy of
various street users.
Language in morbidity and mortality statistics makes clear where within the right-of-way
the Bureau had defined the pedestrian should be. In 1924, the Department classified vehiclepedestrian fatalities, in order, under the following categories: Crossing not at a crossing; Crossing
streets diagonally; Crossing at crosswalks; Running off sidewalks; Stealing rides on vehicles;
Playing games in roadway; Roller skating in roadway; Bicycle riding in roadway; Boarding or
alighting from a vehicle; Falling from vehicles; Working in roadway; Walking in roadway;
Collisions of vehicles; Autos hitting poles, walls, etc; Autos overturning; Autos jumping curb;
Autos falling over embankments; and Other. The list emphasizes the personal responsibility of
pedestrians to stay in pedestrian space by not leaving the sidewalk and crossing only at crosswalks.
Even when the list mentions more automobile related causes, it starts with incidents where
individuals are entering or exiting the vehicle (and thus transitioning from being a pedestrian). The
Department notably doesn’t organize the by number of attributed deaths to each cause. The third
most deadly reported cause, Collisions of vehicles, is near the end of the list. These recordings are
in line with Commissioner Enright’s earlier comments, in which he confirmed that the Department
regularly attributed the vast majority (70% +) of pedestrian-vehicle deaths to the pedestrian.84
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Another significant addition to the traffic safety toolbox was the mapping of locations of
crashes, in order to gain a better understanding of the geography and typology of crashes. The
Bureau shared these maps with school administrators and teachers who emphasized to school
children that they must obey traffic laws and not treat the street as a playground. The Times
reported that the NYPD’s monthly map reports concluded that while jaywalking was the most
common cause of crashes, other significant factors included what I will term children’s activities.
This included “stealing rides on vehicles, playing games in the roadway, roller skating in the
roadway, running into the street from the sidewalk…”85
On May 25th, 1922, Mayor John Hylan signed a proclamation declaring that day Public
Safety Day. While symbolic, mainly intended as a way of urging all residents to engage in safe
traveling behavior, the proclamation also reveals the intractable hold the automobile already had
over the city:

WHEREAS, The Bureau of Public Safety of the Police Department, through and by its
persistent efforts to bring before the people of the city a proper knowledge of the dangers to
life and limb coincidental with the heavy traffic to which our streets are, of economic
necessity, subjected, has achieved a reduction of seven per cent. of fatalities during the first
quarter of the year.86
Many New York residents likely disagreed with Hylan’s assessment that automobile domination of
the right-of-way was an economic necessity. As seen in The Finn Bill, the City curtailed many
economic, social, and political uses of the right-of-way throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
At this time, the NYPD introduced several new regulations intended to make the streets in
New York predictable and safe. Regulations including walking in the street only when necessary,
always walking on the left-hand side of the highway, and crossing only at marked crossings.
Officers regularly enforced these regulations on the street and reiterated them in the Department’s
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reports.87 The Department communicated the new regulations and expectations through newspapers
and safety campaigns. These campaigns, much like the Chicago campaign discussed in the
introduction, focused on both driver and pedestrian behavior. One of the most common methods
for educating the public was pamphleting. Pamphlet instructions for pedestrians ran the gamut from
the whimsical rhyme (“A look in time may save your spine. Educate yourself to cross at the cross
walk”) to the brutish (“Watch out–look out–before you are knocked out.”). They also reinforced
the pedestrianist system with its increasingly hardened borders, reminding denizens that
“Roadways are intended for vehicles, sidewalks and crosswalks are for the pedestrians.”88
Driver pamphlet education was noticeably less droll, containing no rhyming, and instead
exhibiting a serious tone denoting both the drivers’ responsibility on the road but also their
legitimacy. At a Safety First Society of New York meeting in 1915, Police Commissioner Arthur
Woods indicated the NYPD’s believed that pedestrian carelessness contributed more than anything
else to pedestrian-vehicle crashes. This was not a universal belief, however, even among major city
police chiefs. Speaking at the same meeting Detroit Police Commissioner, declared his department
found drivers were usually at fault in such crashes.89
A popular avenue for pedestrian education, for the NYPD and advocacy organizations, was
to target school children, who were often at the center of “good pedestrian” education because they
were far less predictable for drivers. By the early 1920s, officers were regularly educating school
children through pamphleting and school visits. During school visits officers would note
neighborhood locations where frequent crashes happened and recount their details. In 1922 the
Police Department distributed 1.5 million cards, pamphlets, and posters among school children,
drivers and others throughout the city. In the first three years of its existence, the NYPD reported
that the Public Safety Bureau gave safety lectures to about 600,000 school children annually. The
Bureau also prepared monthly traffic safety stories that they distributed to schools so that teachers
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could read them aloud to pupils. Besides safety lectures, the Bureau sought to educate pupils
through safety pledges and short moving pictures that depicted traffic crashes.90 In addition, trade
groups such as the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce worked with city departments to
reinforce new traffic safety rules. In 1921 the Chamber of Commerce held an essay for school
children, in which they awarded $5000 of prizes to winning essayist. The Chamber targeted these
efforts not only at City agencies in charge of the right-of-way but also at parks departments, as the
chamber saw children playing in the right-of-way as one of the largest safety issues.91
While the Bureau spent a significant amount of time educating younger New Yorkers, they
also worked to educate older residents. The Bureau worked with many community groups and
volunteers, including the Boy Scouts, to educate pedestrians about pedestrian regulations. In 1922,
the Scouts distributed 1 million “Aunty J. Walker” cards to pedestrians throughout the city. This
campaign corresponded with the Department issuing large numbers of verbal warnings for
jaywalking (approximately 90,0000 annually in the early 1920s) and ride-stealing (approximately
20,000 annually).92 Other education tools included safety pledge cards for drivers, public service
announcements played before movies, advertisements in newspapers and playbills, safety parades
and caravans, and letters to social clubs.93
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Image 6 – Aunty J Walker was one of the many campaigns the NYPD’s Bureau of Public Safety used to communicate
traffic safety messages to the public.
Credit: New York City Police Department, 1923 Annual Report.

These actions, the communication of expectations and the verbal rebuke of behavior, are
central to effective police power. While there were legal repercussions for some violators of
pedestrian rules, the primary means through which the NYPD reinforced traffic laws were
persuasive efforts, not legal. This was not the case for the Bureau’s interactions with automobile
drivers, who were much more frequently convicted of infractions.94 This does not mean the safety
campaigns were ineffective, however, in fact the opposite is true. The Public Safety Bureau was
extremely effective at communicating not street safety rules but also in defining city spaces.
Through written materials, presentations, and constant verbal reminders, the Police Department
reinforced that the sidewalk was for pedestrians and the roadway for vehicles. The Public Safety
Bureau shaped the right-of-way, which had once been a multi-functional space with unclear, if
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many boundaries, into a mono-dimensional space of movement with clearly demarcated modal
boundaries.
There was little arrest or fine record because all the Police Department had at the time was
the power of education. Jaywalking was such a new idea that the legislation to prevent it was scant.
After the Bureau began studying traffic crashes, they claimed that:
The fact is that “jay-walking” has been established as the specific cause of approximately
45% of all highway fatalities, and that, as such, it leads all others. In other words,
pedestrians, by their failure to exercise a little common sense and by ignoring the most
elementary rules of the road, and by crossing the highways obliquely, or at points other than
at the regular crosswalks, are themselves to blame for nearly half the highway accidents that
end fatally.95
The Department lamented the fact that despite the Bureau’s extensive efforts to educate the public,
traffic crashes remained high. In 1923, the number of injuries and crashes from crossing the street
(whether at a crosswalk) totaled 437 deaths and 11,762 injuries. The Department reported that
playing in the street lead to another 54 deaths and 1,878 injuries. The following years fatalities
crossing the street remain fairly similar, begging the question of how effective the program was.
The Department mused that specific legislation addressing jaywalking seemed to be necessary, as
appeals to safety and morality were not sufficient.96
The NYPD reports don’t break down crashes by driver causes like it does in a great deal for
pedestrian causes. The average observer might suggest that the best remedy would be to provide
more play space for children, who clearly desired it. Instead, the prescribed solution was regulation
and more border hardening. An exception to ignoring children’s needs for play space was the
establishment of school streets and play streets. The City designed these streets to be closed to
vehicular traffic during certain high demand hours during certain hours of the day to provide
children with space to learn and play outside safely.97
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While crossing at crosswalks or not playing in the street seems like a minor concession for
the pedestrian to make to modern observers, it is important to consider the historical context. New
York’s streets had, until this time, functioned largely as a singular public highway, where all users
had a right to pass and repass. Likewise, as described in chapter 1, sidewalks in certain business
quarters of the city were often inaccessible to pedestrians due to commercial activity. Outside these
commercial quarters, however, in the growing residential neighborhoods, streets remained largely
free of cars parked more than an hour. “Crossing” between crosswalks was a normal activity and
not regularly given a second thought. The right-of-way was one space, not many. Introducing more
and faster vehicles to the right-of-way caused a further hardening of the boundaries of the various
spaces in the public right-of-way.
The NYPD’s behavioral regulations and admonishments were not limited to pedestrians,
however. Vehicle operators and property owners frequently found themselves the subject of NYPD
enforcement. Vehicles were no more welcome in pedestrian space than pedestrians were welcome
in vehicle space. One of the greatest headaches to the Police Department, same as it was to Public
Works, was the parking of vehicles or the unloading of vehicles over the sidewalk. In the 1919
Annual Report, the Commissioner notes many businesses were regularly ignoring parking
regulations and leaving vehicles obstructing the sidewalk for hours.98 This universal disdain of
bodies and objects where they “ought” not to be is central to our understanding of what the NYPD
was accomplishing. The Department was not only addressing street safety. It was developing a
safe, ordered, and hard-bordered street that prioritized movement the of street users above all other
potential uses of the right-of-way.
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Conclusion
While the Police Department was scrutinizing norms and adjusting rules for all roadway
users, there were clear winners and losers. Roadway space was becoming more designed and
regulated for the vehicle at the expense of other uses of the roadway, such as playing, selling, and
socializing. In the early twentieth century, police observations and recommendations helped
develop a new system for ordering the right-of-way. While the Department’s motivations
(reduction of traffic fatalities) for developing this system of sidewalk order was noble, it produced
side effects that disadvantaged many residents for decades to come. This system divided the rightof-way into discrete sections, clearly defining them as multiple spaces where once there had been
few.
In this new order, the NYPD sought to educate the population on what constituted
appropriate movement within the right-of-way. The Department’s greatest success in developing
this new system wasn’t predicated on legal power. As records show, officers rarely issued
violations for traffic infractions and when they did, they were mostly given to drivers. Rarely did
the Department issue violations to pedestrians, and instead, they relied on the police power tools of
education, persuasion, and shaming.
The NYPD helped develop a path for the vehicle to replace the pedestrian as the primary
user for whom City designed the street. The introduction of the mass-produced automobile to the
streets of Manhattan forever changed the fabric of the city. From a design standpoint, it altered the
materials necessary to construct a city and changed the standard amenities provided in a limited but
critical public space. With automobiles came an assemblage of objects required to make them
function in a city the size and density of New York. A traffic light or street regulation sign occupies
a point within the public realm that could be instead a tree or a bench. Through a community
justice lens, the introduction of automobiles, along with government subsidized building of
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highways and suburban housing, meant an increasing inequality in an already unequal city. It
facilitated one of the greatest thefts of opportunity from minority communities by making possible
suburban (white) flight a few decades later. It also represented a boundless opportunity for wealth
building for those fortunate enough to be approved for auto and home loans. From a social
standpoint, it altered relations between neighbors forever. The automobile made possible the
suburbs of Queens, Long Island, and New Jersey. It made possible the lack of sidewalk, or at least
a sidewalk without a ballet, as Jacobs described it.99 The social and economic implications
produced by national and state policies of highway and suburban housing subsidization are well
chronicled. Cities exacerbated many of those social and economic implications by enacting policy
decisions surrounding the accommodation of automobiles in urban space. This relatively
unexplored prong of the triptych of federal, state, and local suburbanization policy is key not only
to expanding our understanding of the processes of suburbanization but also to overcoming the
enormous inertia that car-centric right-of-way space allocation has built up over the course of the
last century.
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Conclusion
Out of the lasting implications of the introduction of the mass-produced automobile to New
York City, one of the most significant and least understood may be the establishment of movement
as the primary purpose of the right-of-way. Multiple municipal actors including the police, public
works bureaucrats, and state and local politicians worked together, if not always on the same page,
to establish this new order. The introduction of the automobile and the regulation of all traffic
flows was not unique to New York. This process was a part of a larger phenomenon occurring
around the country. While every municipality had its own unique challenges and solutions, the
establishment of rules, regulations, and ultimately bureaucracies to manage streets and sidewalks
occurred not only at a local level but also on a translocal level, as explored in the introduction. The
early 1900s presented many demands for new bureaucracy and to meet these challenges
municipalities formed associations to learn from each other’s triumphs and failures. In this way, a
great era of municipal statecraft began. Holding regular conferences and producing publications on
how to administrate the city, these associations forged a path for the modern bureaucratic city.
These transformations are important historical pedestrianist precedents. The decisions of municipal
administrators at the turn of the twentieth century left a legacy that still informs the use of
sidewalks in the twenty first century.
The transition from public ownership to municipal ownership marks a significant shift in
American public space. At the turn of the twentieth century, American municipalities set out to
redefine their rights-of-way. This was a complex project that played out nationally and locally
through professional societies and publications foundered to address common urban issues. These
organizations developed policy proposals and municipal structures to implement across the
country. These proposals considered congestion, of all types, to represent a failure of their work
and prioritized unobstructed movement along the street. The prioritization of unobstructed
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movement led city builders to overlook other social, political, and economic functions of the street.
Turn of the century courts upheld legal definitions of the street as a place primarily for pass and
repass but held that municipalities remained liable for the condition of the sidewalk. This finding
increased municipalities’ interest in imposing a greater level of control over the sidewalk, in
making it a municipal space.
These factors resulted in a rapidly evolving urban landscape and administration in New
York City. Engineers and planners from New York City were involved in several professional
associations that both shared New York’s successes and introduced local officials to new policy
prescriptions for the right-of-way. Professional associations provided New York’s city builders
with a forum to redefine what activities, and ultimately what persons they deemed legitimate public
users. Professional associations and conferences facilitated a national audience for pedestrianist
regulation that New York City implemented in locally specific conditions. In many cities, including
New York, sidewalk administrators judged the pedestrian to be one of the ultimate public users, a
designation granted at the expense of many others. The efficient circulation of pedestrians helped
define other activities (such as vending, sleeping, and playing) as disruptive nuisances to regulate
off the sidewalk. This municipal debate about who and what are legitimate public users of the
sidewalk played out in contextually unique ways in each locality, where community members
pushed back against the growing bureaucracy of sidewalk administration.
Space, particularly urban space, is neither eternal nor neutral. Space does not merely
contain social processes; it is also constitutive of them. Space and these social processes mutually
interact and constantly transform one another. The sidewalk is socio-politically constructed to
support the desired ends of those who maintain the political capital to define space. If those who
hold power value large corporate commerce, then small vendors are likely to suffer. If they value
unfettered traffic flow, objects (or people) that result in pause may be the target of legal action. For
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this reason, the sidewalk can become a space municipal authority discourages if not outright bars
any action that encourages pause. It is therefore critical for any scholar or practitioner of urban
spaces to understand the origins of the administrative state that structures the communities they
study. The sidewalk is more than the concrete we walk on. It is not ahistorical, standing outside of
socio-political influence. While significant, public space literature often dismisses sidewalks’
history, which as Blomley states, only “speaks of its hegemonic matter-of-factness.”100 Social and
political actors have imbued the sidewalk with purpose. Its nature is ever changing based on who
holds power to regulate the social construction.
Reconsidering of how municipalities assign space within the right-of-way has recently
been, as discussed in the preface, thrown into overdrive. While COVID-19 has forced
municipalities to grapple with how they assign space and what activities they allow in the right-ofway, I believe we will accomplish little lasting change without addressing the underlying system
that prioritizes traffic flow to the detriment of other uses. The manner in which municipalities
design, maintain, and regulate the right-of-way and sidewalk is not inherent. Geographers, urban
planners, and all interested in issues of urban space and transportation must connect these issues to
the problems of the social division of the city, the modern compartmentalization of the many
dimensions of life. That compartmentalization (one space for work, one for recreation, for
transportation, for shopping, etc.) often increases efficiency, and in the case of vehicle space,
safety. These increases in efficiency, however, come with side effects. Namely, it cuts urban space
and resident’s lives into discrete spaces, alienating residents from their own city in the name of
unobstructed traffic flow. At the turn of the twentieth century, municipal authorities judged
unobstructed movement of pedestrians and vehicles to be of paramount importance. I believe it is
worth revisiting this decision and adjusting as necessary.
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The inability or refusal to take pedestrianism seriously, to identify it as something entirely
outside of the rights-based world of civic humanism, hinders any scholarly or activist attempt to
challenge the power of sidewalk regulations. To make the current reconsideration of right-of-way
space allocation in light of COVID-19 last, it is necessary to understand both national trends in
state-building and the local contextually specific outcomes. Sidewalks have precedents that have
led to specific, diverging public space cultures. Only by calling pedestrianism out, as a logic of
circulation and not one of social, political, ethical, or other civic humanist origins, can we hope to
truly understand it. Only by understanding pedestrianism and how it interacts with a more
traditional rights-based framework of public space, can we recognize how to mediate its power and
develop a more satisfying and equitable public realm.
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